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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1056
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CHARLES W. BURSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND
REPORTER FOR TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v.
MARY REBECCA FREEMAN
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
tennessee, middle division
[May 26, 1992]

  Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice,
Justice White, and Justice Kennedy join.
  Twenty-six years ago, this Court, in a majority opinion
written by Justice Hugo L. Black, struck down a state law
that made it a crime for a newspaper editor to publish an
editorial on election day urging readers to vote in a particu-
lar way.  Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).  While the
Court did not hesitate to denounce the statute as an
``obvious and flagrant abridgment'' of First Amendment
rights, id., at 219, it was quick to point out that its holding
``in no way involve[d] the extent of a State's power to
regulate conduct in and around the polls in order to
maintain peace, order and decorum there.''  Id., at 218.
  Today, we confront the issue carefully left open in Mills.
The question presented is whether a provision of the
Tennessee Code, which prohibits the solicitation of votes
and the display or distribution of campaign materials
within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place, violates
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
                            I
  The State of Tennessee has carved out an election-day
``campaign-free zone'' through 2-7-111(b) of its election
code.  That section reads in pertinent part:
      ``Within the appropriate boundary as established in
    subsection (a) [100 feet from the entrances], and the
    building in which the polling place is located, the
    display of campaign posters, signs or other campaign
    materials, distribution of campaign materials, and
    solicitation of votes for or against any person or
    political party or position on a question are prohibited.''
    Tenn. Code Ann. 2-7-111(b) (Supp. 1991).
Violation of 2-7-111(b) is a Class C misdemeanor
punishable by a term of imprisonment not greater than 30
days or a fine not to exceed $50, or both.  Tenn. Code Ann.
2-19-119 and 40-35-111(e)(3) (1990).
                           II
  Respondent Mary Rebecca Freeman has been a candidate
for office in Tennessee, has managed local campaigns, and
has worked actively in state-wide elections.  In 1987, she
was the treasurer for the campaign of a city-council
candidate in Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County.
  Asserting that 2-7-111(b) and 2-19-119 limited her
ability to communicate with voters, respondent brought a
facial challenge to these statutes in Davidson County

Chancery Court.  She sought a declaratory judgment that
the provisions were unconstitutional under both the United
States and the Tennessee Constitutions.  She also sought a
permanent injunction against their enforcement.
  The Chancellor ruled that the statutes did not violate the
United States or Tennessee Constitutions and dismissed
respondent's suit.  App. 50.  He determined that
2-7-111(b) was a content-neutral and reasonable time,
place, and manner restriction; that the 100-foot boundary
served a compelling state interest in protecting voters from
interference, harassment, and intimidation during the
voting process; and that there was an alternative channel
for respondent to exercise her free-speech rights outside the
100-foot boundary.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a.
  The Tennessee Supreme Court, by a 4-to-1 vote, reversed.
802 S. W. 2d 210 (1990).  The court first held that
2-7-111(b) was content-based ``because it regulates a
specific subject matter, the solicitation of votes and the
display or distribution of campaign materials, and a certain
category of speakers, campaign workers.''  Id., at 213.  The
court then held that such a content-based statute could not
be upheld unless (i) the burden placed on free-speech rights
is justified by a compelling state interest and (ii) the means
chosen bear a substantial relation to that interest and are
the least intrusive to achieve the State's goals.  While the
Tennessee Supreme Court found that the State unquestion-
ably had shown a compelling interest in banning solicita-
tion of voters and distribution of campaign materials within
the polling place itself, it concluded that the State had not
shown a compelling interest in regulating the premises
around the polling place.  Accordingly, the court held that
the 100-foot limit was not narrowly tailored to protect the
demonstrated interest.  The court also held that the statute
was not the least restrictive means to serve the State's
interests.  The court found less restrictive the current
Tennessee statutes prohibiting interference with an election
or the use of violence or intimidation to prevent voting.  See
Tenn. Code Ann. 2-19-101 and 2-19-115 (Supp. 1991).
Finally, the court noted that if the State were able to show
a compelling interest in preventing congestion and disrup-
tion at the entrances to polling places, a shorter radius
``might perhaps pass constitutional muster.''  802 S.W.2d,
at 214.
  Because of the importance of the issue, we granted
certiorari.  498 U.S. ___ (1991).  We now reverse the
Tennessee Supreme Court's judgment that the statute
violates the First Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution.
                           III
  The First Amendment provides that ``Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .''
This Court in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940),
said: ``The freedom of speech . . . which [is] secured by the
First Amendment against abridgment by the United States,
[is] among the fundamental personal rights and liberties
which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against abridgment by a State.''
  The Tennessee statute implicates three central concerns
in our First Amendment jurisprudence: regulation of
political speech, regulation of speech in a public forum, and
regulation based on the content of the speech.  The speech
restricted by 2-7-111(b) obviously is political speech.
``Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of
the First Amendment, there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.''  Mills
v. Alabama, 384 U.S., at 218.  ``For speech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government.''  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
74-75 (1964).  Accordingly, this Court has recognized that
``the First Amendment `has its fullest and most urgent
application' to speech uttered during a campaign for
political office.''  Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Comm.,
489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v.
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
  The second important feature of 2-7-111(b) is that it
bars speech in quintessential public forums.  These forums
include those places ``which by long tradition or by govern-
ment fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,'' such
as parks, streets, and sidewalks.  Perry Education Assn. v.
Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
``Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens.''  Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515
(1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.).  At the same time, however,
expressive activity, even in a quintessential public forum,
may interfere with other important activities for which the
property is used.  Accordingly, this Court has held that the
government may regulate the time, place, and manner of
the expressive activity, so long as such restrictions are
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and leave open ample alternatives
for communication.  United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
177 (1983).  See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
  The Tennessee restriction under consideration, however,
is not a facially content-neutral time, place, or manner
restriction.  Whether individuals may exercise their free-
speech rights near polling places depends entirely on
whether their speech is related to a political campaign.  The
statute does not reach other categories of speech, such as
commercial solicitation, distribution, and display.  This
Court has held that the First Amendment's hostility to
content-based regulation extends not only to a restriction on
a particular viewpoint, but also to a prohibition of public
discussion of an entire topic.  See, e.g., Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530,
537 (1980).  Accord, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York
Crime Victims Bd., __ U.S. __, __ (1991) (slip op. 9) (statute
restricting speech about crime is content-based).
  As a facially content-based restriction on political speech
in a public forum, 2-7-111(b) must be subjected to
exacting scrutiny: The State must show that the ``regulation
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it
is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.''  Perry Education
Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S., at 45.
Accord, Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987); Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense and Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985);
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S., at 177.
  Despite the ritualistic ease with which we state this now-
familiar standard, its announcement does not allow us to
avoid the truly difficult issues involving the First Amend-
ment.  Perhaps foremost among these serious issues are
cases that force us to reconcile our commitment to free
speech with our commitment to other constitutional rights
embodied in government proceedings.  See, e.g., Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361-363 (1966) (outlining restric-
tions on speech of trial participants that courts may impose
to protect an accused's right to a fair trial).  This case
presents us with a particularly difficult reconciliation:
the accommodation of the right to engage in political
discourse with the right to vote-a right at the heart of our
democracy.
                           IV
  Tennessee asserts that its campaign-free zone serves two
compelling interests.  First, the State argues that its
regulation serves its compelling interest in protecting the
right of its citizens to vote freely for the candidates of their
choice.  Second, Tennessee argues that its restriction
protects the right to vote in an election conducted with
integrity and reliability.
  The interests advanced by Tennessee obviously are
compelling ones.  This Court has recognized that the ``right
to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the
essence of a democratic society.''  Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 555 (1964).  Indeed,
    -No right is more precious in a free country than that
    of having a choice in the election of those who make
    the laws under which, as good citizens, they must live.
    Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the
    right to vote is undermined.''  Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
    U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
Accordingly, this Court has concluded that a State has a
compelling interest in protecting voters from confusion and
undue influence.  See Eu, 489 U.S., at 228-229.
  The Court also has recognized that a State ``indisputably
has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its
election process.''  Id., at 231.  The Court thus has ``upheld
generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that
protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process
itself.''  Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, n. 9
(1983) (collecting cases).  In other words, it has recognized
that a State has a compelling interest in ensuring that an
individual's right to vote is not undermined by fraud in the
election process.
  To survive strict scrutiny, however, a State must do more
than assert a compelling state interest-it must demon-
strate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted
interest.  While we readily acknowledge that a law rarely
survives such scrutiny, an examination of the evolution of
election reform, both in this country and abroad, demon-
strates the necessity of restricted areas in or around polling
places.
  During the colonial period, many government officials
were elected by the viva voce method or by the showing of
hands, as was the custom in most parts of Europe.  That
voting scheme was not a private affair, but an open, public
decision, witnessed by all and improperly influenced by
some.  The opportunities that the viva voce system gave for
bribery and intimidation gradually led to its repeal.  See
generally, E. Evans, A History of the Australian Ballot
System in the United States 1-6 (1917) (Evans); J. Harris,
Election Administration in the United States 15-16 (1934)
(Harris); J. Rusk, The Effect of the Australian Ballot
Reform on Split Ticket Voting, 1876-1888, 8-11 (1968)
(Rusk).
  Within 20 years of the formation of the Union, most
States had incorporated the paper ballot into their electoral
system.  Initially, this paper ballot was a vast improvement.
Individual voters made their own handwritten ballots,
marked them in the privacy of their homes, and then
brought them to the polls for counting.  But the effort of
making out such a ballot became increasingly more complex
and cumbersome.  See generally, S. Albright, The American
Ballot 14-19 (1942) (Albright); Evans 5; Rusk 9-14.
  Wishing to gain influence, political parties began to
produce their own ballots for voters.  These ballots were
often printed with flamboyant colors, distinctive designs,
and emblems so that they could be recognized at a distance.
State attempts to standardize the ballots were easily
thwarted-the vote-buyer could simply place a ballot in the
hands of the bribed voter and watch until he placed it in
the polling box.  Thus, the evils associated with the earlier
viva voce system reinfected the election process; the failure
of the law to secure secrecy opened the door to bribery and
intimidation.  See generally, Albright 19-20; Evans 7, 11;
Harris 17, 151-152; V. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure
Groups 649 (1952); J. Reynolds, Testing Democracy:
Electoral Behavior and Progressive Reform in New Jersey,
1880-1920, 36 (1988); Rusk 14-23.
  Approaching the polling place under this system was akin
to entering an open auction place.  As the elector started
his journey to the polls, he was met by various party ticket
peddlers ``who were only too anxious to supply him with
their party tickets.''  Evans 9.  Often the competition
became heated when several such peddlers found an
uncommitted or wavering voter.  See L. Fredman, The
Australian Ballot:  The Story of an American Reform 24
(1968) (Fredman); Rusk 17.  Sham battles were frequently
engaged in to keep away elderly and timid voters of the
opposition.  See Fredman 24, 26-27; 115 North American
Review 628-629 (cited in Evans 16).  In short, these early
elections ``were not a very pleasant spectacle for those who
believed in democratic government.''  Evans 10.
  The problems with voter intimidation and election fraud
that the United States was experiencing were not unique.
Several other countries were attempting to work out
satisfactory solutions to these same problems.  Some
Australian provinces adopted a series of reforms intended
to secure the secrecy of an elector's vote.  The most famous
feature of the Australian system was its provision for an
official ballot, encompassing all candidates of all parties on
the same ticket.  But this was not the only measure
adopted to preserve the secrecy of the ballot.  The Austra-
lian system also provided for the erection of polling booths
(containing several voting compartments) open only to
election officials, two ``scrutinees'' for each candidate, and
electors about to vote.  See J. Wigmore, The Australian
Ballot System as Embodied in the Legislation of Various
Countries 69, 71, 78, 79 (1889) (Wigmore) (excerpting
provisions adopted by South Australia and Queensland).
See generally, Albright 23; Evans 17; Rusk 23-24.
  The Australian system was enacted in England in 1872
after a study by the committee of election practices identi-
fied Australia's ballot as the best possible remedy for the
existing situation.  See Wigmore 14-16.  Belgium followed
England's example in 1877.  Like the Australian provinces,
both England and Belgium excluded the general public from
the entire polling room.  See Wigmore 94, 105.  See general-
ly, Albright 23-24; Evans 17-18; Rusk 24-25.
  One of the earliest indications of the reform movement in
this country came in 1882 when the Philadelphia Civil
Service Reform Association urged its adoption in a pam-
phlet entitled ``English Elections.''  Many articles were
written praising its usefulness in preventing bribery,
intimidation, disorder, and inefficiency at the polls.
Commentators argued that it would diminish the growing
evil of bribery by removing the knowledge of whether it had
been successful.  Another argument strongly urged in favor
of the reform was that it would protect the weak and
dependent against intimidation and coercion by employers
and creditors.  The inability to determine the effectiveness
of bribery and intimidation accordingly would create order
and decency at the polls.  See generally, Albright 24-26;
Evans 21-23; Rusk 25-29, 42-43.
  After several failed attempts to adopt the Australian
system in Michigan and Wisconsin, the Louisville, Ken-
tucky, municipal government, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and the State of New York adopted the
Australian system in 1888.  The Louisville law prohibited
all but voters, candidates or their agents, and electors from
coming within 50 feet of the voting room inclosure.  The
Louisville law also provided that candidates' agents within
the restricted area ``were not allowed to persuade, influence,
or intimidate any one in the choice of his candidate, or to
attempt doing so . . . .''  Wigmore 120.  The Massachusetts
and New York laws differed somewhat from the previous
acts in that they excluded the general public only from the
area encompassed within a guard rail constructed six feet
from the voting compartments.  See id., at 47, 128.  This
modification was considered an improvement because it
provided additional monitoring by members of the general
public and independent candidates, who in most States
were not allowed to be represented by separate inspectors.
Otherwise, ``in order to perpetrate almost every election
fraud it would only be necessary to buy up the election
officers of the other party.''  Id., at 52.  Finally, New York
also prohibited any person from ``electioneering on election
day within any polling-place, or within one hundred feet of
any polling place.''  Id., at 131.  See generally, Evans 18-21;
Rusk 26.
  The success achieved through these reforms was immedi-
ately noticed and widely praised.  See generally, Evans
21-24; Rusk 26-31, 42-43.  One commentator remarked of
the New York law of 1888:
      ``We have secured secrecy; and intimidation by
    employers, party bosses, police officers, saloonkeepers
    and others has come to an end.
            -In earlier times our polling places were fre-
        quently, to quote the litany, `scenes of battle,
        murder, and sudden death.'  This also has come to
        an end, and until nightfall, when the jubilation
        begins, our election days are now as peaceful as
        our Sabbaths.
             ``The new legislation has also rendered impossi-
        ble the old methods of frank, hardy, straightfor-
        ward and shameless bribery of voters at the polls.''
        W. Ivins, The Electoral System of the State of New York, Proceedings of the 29th Annual Meetin.g of
        the New York State Bar Association 316 (1906).
  The triumphs of 1888 set off a rapid and widespread
adoption of the Australian system in the United States.  By
1896, almost 90 percent of the States had adopted the
Australian system.  This accounted for 92 percent of the
national electorate.  See Rusk 30-31.  See also Albright
26-28; Evans 27; Justice Scalia, Concurring in Judgment,
post, at 2, n. 1 (citations to statutes passed before 1900).
  The roots of Tennessee's regulation can be traced back to
two provisions passed during this period of rapid reform.
Tennessee passed the first relevant provision in 1890 as
part of its switch to an Australian system.  In its effort to
``secur[e] the purity of elections,'' Tennessee provided that
only voters and certain election officials were permitted
within the room where the election was held or within 50
feet of the entrance.  The act did not provide any penalty
for violation and applied only in the more highly populated
counties and cities.  1890 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 24, 12 and
13.
  The second relevant provision was passed in 1901 as an
amendment to Tennessee's ``Act to preserve the purity of
elections, and define and punish offenses against the
elective franchise.''  The original act, passed in 1897, made
it a misdemeanor to commit various election offenses,
including the use of bribery, violence or intimidation in
order to induce a person to vote or refrain from voting for
any particular person or measure.  1897 Tenn. Pub. Acts,
ch. 14.  The 1901 amendment made it a misdemeanor for
any person, except the officers holding the elections, to
approach nearer than 30 feet to any voter or ballot box.
This provision applied to all Tennessee elections.  1901
Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 142.
  These two laws remained relatively unchanged until
1967, when Tennessee added yet another proscription to its
secret ballot law.  This amendment prohibited the distribu-
tion of campaign literature ``on the same floor of a building,
or within one hundred (100) feet thereof, where an election
is in progress.''  1967 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 85.
  In 1972, the State enacted a comprehensive code to
regulate the conduct of elections.  The code included a
section that proscribed the display and the distribution of
campaign material and the solicitation of votes within 100
feet of the entrance to a polling place.  The 1972 ``campaign-
free zone'' is the direct precursor of the restriction chal-
lenged in the present litigation.
  Today, all 50 States limit access to the areas in or around
polling places.  See App. to Pet. for Cert 26a-50a; Note,
Defoliating the Grassroots: Election Day Restrictions on
Political Speech, 77 Geo. L.J. 2137 (1989) (summarizing
statutes as of 1989).  The National Labor Relations Board
also limits activities at or near polling places in union-
representation elections.
  In sum, an examination of the history of election regula-
tion in this country reveals a persistent battle against two
evils:  voter intimidation and election fraud.  After an
unsuccessful experiment with an unofficial ballot system,
all 50 States, together with numerous other Western
democracies, settled on the same solution: a secret ballot
secured in part by a restricted zone around the voting
compartments.  We find that this wide-spread and time-
tested consensus demonstrates that some restricted zone is
necessary in order to serve the States' compelling interest
in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud.
  Respondent and the dissent advance three principal chal-
lenges to this conclusion.  First, respondent argues that
restricted zones are overinclusive because States could
secure these same compelling interests with statutes that
make it a misdemeanor to interfere with an election or to
use violence or intimidation to prevent voting.  See, e.g.,
Tenn. Code Ann. 2-19-101 and 2-19-115 (Supp. 1991).
We are not persuaded.  Intimidation and interference laws
fall short of serving a State's compelling interests because
they ``deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts''
to impede elections.  Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28
(1976) (existence of bribery statute does not preclude need
for limits on contributions to political campaigns).  More-
over, because law enforcement officers generally are barred
from the vicinity of the polls to avoid any appearance of
coercion in the electoral process, see Tenn. Code Ann.
2-7-103 (1985), many acts of interference would go
undetected.  These undetected or less than blatant acts may
nonetheless drive the voter away before remedial action can
be taken.
  Second, respondent and the dissent argue that
Tennessee's statute is underinclusive because it does not
restrict other types of speech, such as charitable and
commercial solicitation or exit polling, within the 100-foot
zone.  We agree that distinguishing among types of speech
requires that the statute be subjected to strict scrutiny.  We
do not, however, agree that the failure to regulate all
speech renders the statute fatally underinclusive.  In fact,
as one early commentator pointed out, allowing members of
the general public access to the polling place makes it more
difficult for political machines to buy off all the monitors.
See Wigmore 52.  But regardless of the need for such
additional monitoring, there is, as summarized above,
ample evidence that political candidates have used cam-
paign workers to commit voter intimidation or electoral
fraud.  In contrast, there is simply no evidence that political
candidates have used other forms of solicitation or exit
polling to commit such electoral abuses.  States adopt laws
to address the problems that confront them.  The First
Amendment does not require States to regulate for prob-
lems that do not exist.
  Finally, the dissent argues that we confuse history with
necessity.  Yet the dissent concedes that a secret ballot was
necessary to cure electoral abuses.  Contrary to the
dissent's contention, the link between ballot secrecy and
some restricted zone surrounding the voting area is not
merely timing-it is common sense.  The only way to
preserve the secrecy of the ballot is to limit access to the
area around the voter.  Accordingly, we hold that some
restricted zone around the voting area is necessary to
secure the State's compelling interest.
  The real question then is how large a restricted zone is
permissible or sufficiently tailored.  Respondent and the
dissent argue that Tennessee's 100-foot boundary is not
narrowly drawn to achieve the State's compelling interest
in protecting the right to vote.  We disagree.
  As a preliminary matter, the long, uninterrupted and
prevalent use of these statutes makes it difficult for States
to come forward with the sort of proof the dissent wishes to
require.  The majority of these laws were adopted originally
in the 1890s, long before States engaged in extensive
legislative hearings on election regulations.  The prevalence
of these laws, both here and abroad, then encouraged their
reenactment without much comment.  The fact that these
laws have been in effect for a long period of time also
makes it difficult for the States to put on witnesses who can
testify as to what would happen without them.  Finally, it
is difficult to isolate the exact effect of these laws on voter
intimidation and election fraud.  Successful voter intimida-
tion and election fraud is successful precisely because it is
difficult to detect.
  Furthermore, because a government has such a compel-
ling interest in securing the right to vote freely and
effectively, this Court never has held a State ``to the burden
of demonstrating empirically the objective effects on
political stability that [are] produced'' by the voting regula-
tion in question.  Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479
U.S. 189, 195 (1986).  Elections vary from year to year,
and place to place.  It is therefore difficult to make specific
findings about the effects of a voting regulation.  Moreover,
the remedy for a tainted election is an imperfect one.
Rerunning an election would have a negative impact on
voter turnout.  Thus, requiring proof that a 100-foot
boundary is perfectly tailored to deal with voter intimida-
tion and election fraud
    ``would necessitate that a State's political system
    sustain some level of damage before the legislature
    could take corrective action.  Legislatures, we think,
    should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies
    in the electoral process with foresight rather than
    reactively, provided that the response is reasonable and
    does not significantly impinge on constitutionally
    protected rights.''  Id., at 195-196 (emphasis added).
  We do not think that the minor geographic limitation
prescribed by 2-7-111(b) constitutes such a significant
impingement.  Thus, we simply do not view the question
whether the 100-foot boundary line could be somewhat
tighter as a question of ``constitutional dimension.''  Munro
v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S., at 197.  Reducing the
boundary to 25 feet, as suggested by the Tennessee Su-
preme Court, 802 S.W.2d, at 214, is a difference only in
degree, not a less restrictive alternative in kind.  Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S., at 30.  As was pointed out in the dissenting
opinion in the Tennessee Supreme Court, it ``takes approxi-
mately 15 seconds to walk 75 feet.''  802 S.W.2d, at 215.
The State of Tennessee has decided that these last 15
seconds before its citizens enter the polling place should be
their own, as free from interference as possible.  We do not
find that this is an unconstitutional choice.
  At some measurable distance from the polls, of course,
governmental regulation of vote solicitation could effectively
become an impermissible burden akin to the statute struck
down in Mills v. Alabama, supra.  See also Meyer v. Grant,
486 U.S. 414 (1988) (invalidating absolute bar against the
use of paid circulators).  In reviewing challenges to specific
provisions of a State's election laws, however, this Court
has not employed any ```litmus-paper test' that will separate
valid from invalid restrictions.''  Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S., at 789 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730
(1974)).  Accordingly, it is sufficient to say that in establish-
ing a 100-foot boundary, Tennessee is on the constitutional
side of the line.
  In conclusion, we reaffirm that it is the rare case in
which we have held that a law survives strict scrutiny.
This, however, is such a rare case.  Here, the State, as
recognized administrator of elections, has asserted that the
exercise of free speech rights conflicts with another funda-
mental right, the right to cast a ballot in an election free
from the taint of intimidation and fraud.  A long history, a
substantial consensus, and simple common sense show that
some restricted zone around polling places is necessary to
protect that fundamental right.  Given the conflict between
these two rights, we hold that requiring solicitors to stand
100 feet from the entrances to polling places does not
constitute an unconstitutional compromise.
  The judgment of the Tennessee Supreme Court is re-
versed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
                                      It is so ordered.

  Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.